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The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern
Environmental Assessment Law

Environmental assessment (EA) is a cornerstone of environmental law. It provides
a legal framework for public decision-making about major development projects
with implications for environmental protection and the rights and title of Indigenous
Peoples. Despite significant literature supporting deliberation as the preferred mode
of engagement with those affected by EA decisions, the specific legal demands of EA
legislation remain undeveloped. This article suggests a legal foundation for deliberative
environmental assessment. It argues that modern EA can be understood through three
public law frames: procedural fairness, public inquiry, and the framework for the duty to
consult and accommodate. It further argues that these three public law frames share
features of deliberative decision-making that can and should inform the implementation
and interpretation of new design features in British Columbia and Canada’s reformed
EA legislation.
L’évaluation environnementale est une pierre angulaire du droit de l’environnement. Elle
fournit un cadre juridique pour la prise de décisions par les instances publiques relatives
aux grands projets de développement ayant des conséquences pour la protection de
l’environnement et les droits et titres des peuples autochtones. Malgré l’existence d’une
importante littérature soutenant que la consultation et la délibération constituent le
mode d’engagement privilégié avec les personnes visées par les décisions touchant les
évaluations environnementales, les exigences juridiques spécifiques de la législation
en matière d’évaluation environnementale restent peu développées. Le présent article
propose un fondement juridique pour l’évaluation environnementale délibérative. Il
fait valoir que l’évaluation environnementale moderne peut être comprise à la lumière
de trois cadres de droit public : l’équité procédurale, l’enquête publique et l’obligation
de consulter et d’accommoder. Il fait également valoir que ces trois cadres de droit
public partagent des caractéristiques de la prise de décision délibérative qui peuvent et
doivent éclairer la mise en œuvre et l’interprétation des nouvelles caractéristiques de
la législation sur l’évaluation environnementale en Colombie-Britannique et au Canada.
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1. The basics of EA and the DCA
2. Deliberative EA and public authority
II. Environmental law’s public law frames and their deliberative
dimensions
1. Administrative law: The duty of fairness
a. EA as procedural fairness for the public
b. Deliberative conditions in the duty of fairness
2. Regulation: Early Canadian EA
a. EA as public inquiry in miniature
b. The deliberative features of the inquiry and its influence
3. Constitutional law: The duty to consult and accommodate
a. EA as framework for the duty to consult and accommodate
b. The deliberative features of the duty to consult and
accomodate
III. Modern environmental assessment law reform
Conclusion

Introduction
Environmental assessment (EA) law provides the legal framework for
deciding whether, and how, controversial development projects proceed in
light of their anticipated impacts on the environment and constitutionallyprotected Aboriginal and treaty rights. The social, environmental, and
economic stakes of decisions about pipelines, hydroelectric dams, or
heavy metal mines, for example, are identified, assessed, and adjudicated
through EA law.
The stakes of most EA decisions are enormous. The enduring
challenge of EA legislation is to provide a framework that allows for
these stakes to be assessed, understood, and addressed in a democratically
legitimate manner. Environmental law scholars have analogized EA to
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Magna Carta1 for the environment and argued it is “quasi-constitutional”
in nature because of the vital role it plays in generating publicly justified
decisions.2 EA scholarship, by and large, resolves this challenge in favour
of a deliberative model of EA3; that is, a set of requirements that fosters
robust exchange and mutual learning amongst those affected by the project
proposal (industry proponents, government agencies, local communities,
Indigenous Nations, the public generally).
The model of deliberative EA has not, however, translated to the
implementation and interpretation of Canadian EA legislation. Perhaps
because of the unique, technical, and complex structure of EA legislation,
its deliberative potential remains unfulfilled. As explained below, when
decisions are judicially reviewed, the courts seem to understand EA
legislation as requiring a wholly technical process and/or generating a
wholly political decision. Case law has yet to elucidate the deliberative
qualities latent in EA law, missing the connection between deliberation
and the rule of law and the potential for deliberation to better achieve
EA’s legislated objectives of sustainable development and environmental
protection. In other words, deliberative EA in the Canadian context is
largely understood as an aspirational policy goal. This understanding
misses its essential Canadian public law context, namely, the duty of
fairness, public inquiries, and the duty to consult and accommodate
Aboriginal Peoples (DCA).
Recent legislative changes to EA provide a timely illustration of the
need to clarify the public law dimensions of modern EA law. Both BC and
Canada have undertaken significant law reform efforts to “revitalize”4 EA
legislation and “restore public trust.”5 Both governments have committed
to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), which contains an obligation on States to “consult
1.
Elizabeth Fisher, “Environmental Impact Assessment: ‘Setting the Law Ablaze’” in Douglas
Fisher, ed, Research Handbook on Fundamental Concepts of Environmental Law (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2016) 422 at 422, 426 [Fisher, “Setting the Law Ablaze”] (citing to William H Rodgers,
“The Most Creative Moments in the History of US Environmental Law: ‘The Whats’” [2000] U Ill L
Rev 1 at 31).
2.
Jocelyn Stacey, “The Environmental, Democratic, and Rule-of-Law Implications of Harper’s
Environmental Assessment Legacy” (2016) 21:2 Rev Const Stud 165 [Stacey, “Legacy”].
3.
See Part I-2, infra.
4.
Environmental Assessment Revitalization Intentions Paper (Victoria: Government of British
Columbia, 2018), Government of British Columbia at 3, online (pdf): <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/
assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/environmental-assessments/environmentalassessment-revitalization/documents/ea_revitalization_intentions_paper.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/
T25J-4FSD] [BC Intentions Paper].
5.
Minister of Environment and Climate Change Mandate Letter (12 November 2015), Government
of Canada, online: <https://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-environment-and-climate-change-mandate-letter>.
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and cooperate in good faith with the [I]ndigenous [P]eoples concerned
…in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval
of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources.”6 In
line with these commitments, BC and Canada’s reformed statutes contain
new design features: opportunities for early public involvement, the
incorporation of community knowledge, and a recognition of Indigenous
jurisdiction, which, in BC, includes consensus-seeking obligations on
provincial officials. These are laudable developments. But they increase
the complexity of EA regimes, further compounding the risk that EA’s
connections to more familiar public law frames will remain obscured.
This article defends a legal foundation for deliberative EA. It argues
that modern EA can be understood through three public law frames:
procedural fairness, public inquiry, and the DCA. It shows how these
public law frames contain essential conditions for deliberation. The article
argues that each frame—albeit implicitly and incompletely—recognizes
the responsible agency of those affected, fosters mutual respect through
participatory processes, and requires decision-makers to be reflexive in
their decisions. In other words, each frame contains conditions that, when
fulfilled, can generate publicly justified decisions in accordance with the
rule of law.
Before outlining the article’s structure, a caveat is needed on its
approach to the DCA. The DCA is a constitutional obligation that exists
independently of EA law. Yet, as this article details, EA law plays a
significant role in implementing the DCA. Moreover, the Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) has furnished the DCA with the contents of Canadian
administrative law, drawing on common law notions of participatory
rights.7 The article’s purpose is not to propose incremental reforms to the
DCA, although that may be one effect. Reforms to the DCA must address
the concerns of Indigenous communities, Indigenous scholars, and
their allies who are clear that, as currently conceived and implemented,
the DCA fails to meet international norms and continues the project of
colonization.8 This article takes an internal approach to the DCA to show
6.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 October 2007, UNGA A/
RES/61/295 at Article 32(2), subject to the limitations in Article 46; BC Intentions Paper, supra note
4 at 8.
7.
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 41 [Haida];
Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at paras 46-47.
8.
Gordon Christie, “Developing Case Law: The Future of Consultation and Accommodation”
(2006) 39:1 UBC L Rev 139; Robert Hamilton & Joshua Nichols, “The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa
Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult” (2019) 56:3 Alta L Rev 729; Bruce McIvor, First
Peoples Law: Essays on Canadian Law and Decolonization, 3rd ed (First Peoples Law, 2018) at 6977; Erin Hanson, Coast Salish Law and Jurisdiction over Natural Resources: A Case Study with the
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that it is an instance in which Canadian courts have actively developed
deliberative conditions within a Canadian public law framework, even if
courts are unwilling to give those conditions their full effect.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the basic structure
of EA law in BC and Canada, identifying the legal challenge posed by
existing judicial interpretation of EA legislation. It then turns to the case
for deliberative EA and explains why this theoretical framing enjoys such
support in the EA literature. Drawing from existing scholarship on the
relationship between law and deliberative democracy, it highlights three
conditions that must be in place for the law to support deliberative decisionmaking: recognition of the responsible agency of those affected, mutual
respect, and reflexivity. Part II explains modern EA practice through three
public law frames: (1) EA as procedural fairness for the public, (2) EA
as public inquiry in miniature, and (3) EA as statutory framework for the
DCA. Part II takes each of these public law frames and identifies within
them the three essential conditions for deliberative decision-making. Part
III of the article offers an example of how a deliberative understanding
of these three frames can elucidate a new feature in BC and Canada’s
reformed EA legislation. Using the planning phase/early engagement
stage as an example, it highlights how this reform blends and extends upon
the three public law frames. It then identifies how the three deliberative
conditions can guide its implementation and interpretation going forward.
I.

Environmental assessment law and the duty to consult and
accommodate in Canada

1. The basics of EA and the DCA
EA is a decision-making procedure that requires the identification,
consideration, and prevention of environmental harm before it happens. EA
has a planning function in that it involves the assessment of interconnected
environmental issues as well as economic, social, and cultural concerns.
The SCC has described EA as “a planning tool that is now generally
regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making.”9 EA
legislation is a central feature of Canadian environmental law. EAs are a

Tsleil-Waututh Nation (MA Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2018) [unpublished]; Bryn Gray,
“Building Relationships and Advancing Reconciliation through Meaningful Consultation: Report to
the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs (30 May 2016), online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.
gc.ca/eng/1498765671013/1498765827601> [https://perma.cc/3NZC-XPFW].
9.
Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at 71, 88
DLR (4th) 1 [Oldman].
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legal prerequisite to government approval of major development projects
and are also used to inform policy formation and regional development.10
In Canada, EA is one of the few sites in which the risks and benefits of
environmental and social impacts inform environmental decision-making
in a transparent manner.11 The assessment of these risks and benefits can
sometimes lead to project proposals being rejected; however, the focus
is typically on alterations, mitigation measures, and conditions that can
prevent some environmental harms while still allowing the project to
proceed.12 Once project proposals receive an EA approval, they must be
constructed, operated, and decommissioned in accordance with applicable
regulatory regimes (eg mining law, fisheries law).
The DCA is also an integral component of Crown decision-making in
Canada. The DCA flows from the honour of the Crown, which requires that
the Crown act honourably in all its dealings with Indigenous Peoples.13 As
articulated by the SCC in Haida and subsequent decisions, the DCA is
engaged when the Crown contemplates action that may adversely impact
Aboriginal or treaty rights.14 Approving a development project by granting
an EA permit is Crown conduct that virtually always engages the DCA,
given the geography of Canada, traditional and ongoing land use and
governance, and the interconnected nature of environmental impacts. As
explained in Part II-3 below, EA and the DCA have been intertwined in
practice for some time.
The SCC has recognized that both EA and the DCA have a vital role
in ensuring decisions are made in the public interest. In Clyde River, the
Court stated that “the duty to consult, being a constitutional imperative,
gives rise to a special public interest that supersedes other concerns.”15 The
Court has also identified environmental protection as a “public purpose of

10. Though these latter EA tools are better developed elsewhere: see, eg, Barry Dalal-Clayton &
Barry Sadler, Strategic Environmental Assessment: A Sourcebook and Reference Guide to International
Experience (London: Earthscan, 2005).
11. Stacey, “Legacy,” supra note 2 at 171; David R Boyd, Unnatural Law: Rethinking Canadian
Environmental Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003) at 233, 244-248.
12. Meinhard Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process—A Guide and Critique
(Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) at 25 (summarizing effective, efficient and fair EA).
13. Haida, supra note 7 at paras 16-17.
14. Ibid at para 35; Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc, 2017 SCC 40 at paras 25,
29 [CR].
15. CR, supra note 14 at para 40 (citing to Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010
SCC 43 at para 70 [CS]).
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superordinate importance”16 and that understanding the “consequences…
from environmental change are integral to decision-making.”17
EA is thus a crucial point for government decision-makers to
engage with individuals and communities who will be affected by major
development decisions. This engagement is essential to making decisions
about land, water, resources, etc, that not only comply with legislative
requirements in a formal sense but also have the qualities of democratic and
legal authority. Some have described EA as something like Magna Carta
for the environmental context, observing that “just like that document, it is
an official statement of the principles of governance, and accordingly it is
an articulation of a good society.”18
Recent legislative reform to EA in BC and at the federal level enhance
the obligations of decision-makers to engage meaningfully with those
affected. For example, the reformed legislation contains three design
features that do not easily map onto pre-existing modes of engagement.
Both statutes contain a planning stage, which creates a process for
engagement to determine the plan for the subsequent EA.19 Both statutes
require inclusion of community knowledge,20 blurring the lines between
process and substance and citizen and expert. Both statutes recognize
Indigenous jurisdiction,21 and BC’s legislation recognizes a consensusseeking obligation on the agency and ministers who implement the Act.22
These are all laudable reforms with the potential to significantly
improve or rectify failures of their predecessors.23 The challenge is that
the specific legal contours of EA’s requirements for engaging with those
affected are undeveloped. Despite detailed legislation setting out EA
requirements and standards, the dominant judicial characterization of
EA decisions is as either “essentially political in nature”24 or as scientific
16. R v HydroQuébec, [1997] 3 SCR 213 at para 85. See also Ontario v Canadian Pacific Ltd, [1995]
SCR 1031 at para 55.
17. Oldman, supra note 9 at 37.
18. Supra note 1.
19. The “planning phase” at the federal level: Impact Assessment Act, SC 2019, c 28, ss 10-15 [IAA].
Early engagement under the BC legislation: Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2018, c 51, ss 13-18
[EAA].
20. IAA, supra note 19, ss 6((1)(j), 22(1)(m); EAA, supra note 19, s 2(2)(a).
21. IAA, supra note 19, s 2; EAA, supra note 19, s 2(2)(b)(ii)(b).
22. EAA, supra note 19, ss 16(1), 19(1), 27(5), 28(3), 29(3).
23. For critique of the past iteration of federal EA see eg Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 2012: The End of
Federal EA as We Know it?” (2012) 24:1 J Envtl L & Prac 1; Robert B Gibson, “In Full Retreat: The
Canadian Government’s New Environmental Assessment Law Undoes Decades of Progress” (2012)
30:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 179 [Gibson, “In Full Retreat”].
24. Peace Valley Landowner Assn v British Columbia (Minister of Environment), 2016 BCCA 377
at para 29; RK Heli-Ski Panorama Inc v Jumbo Glacier Resort Project (Project Assessment Director),
2007 BCCA 9 at para 30; Gitxaala Nation v Canada, 2016 FCA 187 at para 154 [Gitxaala]; Peace
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exercises not subject to review by the court.25 Despite judicial assurances
that fair procedure is the “handmaiden of justice,”26 Canadian courts have
been reluctant to supervise the implementation of statutory EA procedures
in a way that furthers the access to justice objectives of EA legislation.27
These dominant judicial stances on EA legislative requirements
belie the deliberative features immanent in EA schemes. As the next part
argues, deliberative EA is not simply a policy aspiration or best practice.
Deliberative EA is, rather, the model for exercising public authority over
the environment in a way that accords with both democratic and rule of
law requirements.
2. Deliberative EA and public authority
Deliberation is defined as “debate and discussion aimed at producing
reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to
revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims
made by fellow participants.”28 Deliberation as a mode of exchange
differs from bargaining (in which parties advance purely self-interested
positions) and rhetoric, though it may involve bits of both.29 As described
below, deliberation is the manner of interaction supported by theories of
deliberative democracy.30 Deliberative democrats champion the capacity
of citizens to contribute to collective decisions “at every stage of policy
formation.”31

Valley Landowner Assn v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1027 at para 68.
25. The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal’s platitude about courts not being academies of
science is particularly relevant here: Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA
186 at paras 126-130; Inverhuron & District Ratepayers’ Assn v Canada (Minister of the Environment),
[2000] FCJ No 682, 2000 CarswellNat 5474 at para 47. But see Pembina Institute for Appropriate
Development v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 302 at paras 72-73.
26. See eg Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 129; Gagne v British Columbia
(Director, Environmental Management), 2014 BCSC 2077 at para 46; Clifford v Ontario (Attorney
General), 2009 ONCA 670 at para 23; Maritime Broadcasting System Ltd v Canadian Media Guild,
2014 FCA 59 at para 129.
27. VAPOR v British Columbia (Environment), 2015 BCSC 1086 at para 93; Mary Liston, “Expanding
the Parameters of Participatory Public Law: A Democratic Right to Public Participation and the State’s
Duty of Public Consultation” (2017) 63:2 McGill LJ 375 at 411-415 [Liston, “Democracy”].
28. Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory” (2003) 6:1 Annual Rev Political Science
307 at 309 [Chambers].
29. Francesca Polletta & Beth Gharrity Gardner, “The Forms of Deliberative Communication” in
André Bächtiger, John S Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge & Mark E Warren, eds, The Oxford Handbook of
Deliberative Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018) 70 at 71-72.
30. Note that the focus of this article is on the potential for government-led decisions to be more in
line with the conditions of deliberative democracy. This frame of state decision-making narrows the
range of deliberative possibilities. Deliberative democrats note that the radical and critical potential in
deliberative democracy typically lies outside state institutions in the public sphere.
31. Chambers, supra note 28 at 317.
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EA scholarship contains much support for deliberative EA. Neil Craik,
for example, describes deliberative EA as:
developing and inculcating shared values around environmental
decisions.…The substantive goals that underlie EIA [environmental
impact assessment] are understood to be more than symbolic and of
instrumental value, since the participants are required to justify their
positions considering the available information, public comments and
the environmental objectives of EIA.32

On this view, through the integration of community participation and
technical expertise, participants come to understand the significance of
anticipated effects and they “may reconsider their interests in light of both
factual and normative information.”33 Many scholars see deliberation as
essential for sustainable decision-making because it provides for social
learning that can dislodge unsustainable assumptions.34 Moreover,
deliberative participation in EA is understood as an exercise in citizenship,
which both builds democratic capacity and provides democratic authority
to decisions with significant public impacts.35
Deliberative decision-making is typically situated within theories
of deliberative democracy, which foreground public reason (rather than
preference-aggregation) in democracies.36 A key marker of deliberative
32. Neil Craik, “The Assessment of Environmental Impact” in Emma Lees & Jorge E Viñuales,
eds, Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2019) 876 at 882 [Craik, “Assessment”]. Writing about Australia, Fisher observes: “EIA was one
of the tools developed to ensure that ‘the deliberative obligation’ is discharged.” Elizabeth Fisher,
Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Oxford and Portland OR: Hart Publishing,
2007) at 129 (footnotes omitted); see also Hans Wiklund “In Search of Arenas for Democratic
Deliberation: a Habermasian Review of Environmental Assessment” (2005) 23:4 Impact Assessment
& Project Appraisal 281; A John Sinclair & Alan P Diduck, “Reconceptualizing Public Participation in
Environmental Assessment as EA Civics” (2017) 62 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 174; Neil
Craik, “Process and Reconciliation: Integrating the Duty to Consult with Environmental Assessment”
(2016) 53:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 632 at 673-674 [Craik “Reconciliation”]; Jane Holder, Environmental
Assessment: The Regulation of Decision Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 27-29;
John R Parkins, “Deliberative Democracy, Institution Building, and the Pragmatics of Cumulative
Effects Assessment” (2011) 16:3 Ecology & Society 30.
33. Craik, “Assessment,” supra note 32 at 882; Holder, supra note 32 at 28.
34. A John Sinclair, Alan Diduck & Patricia Fitzpatrick, “Conceptualizing Learning for Sustainability
Through Environmental Assessment: Critical Reflections on 15 Years of Research” (2008) 28:7
Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 415 at 425. Deliberative environmental decision-making
outside the EA context also has significant support: see eg John S Dryzek & Jonathan Pickering,
“Deliberation as a Catalyst for Reflexive Environmental Governance” (2017) 131 Ecological
Economics 353; Jenny Steele, “Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a
Problem-solving Approach” (2001) 21:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 415.
35. Ciaran O’Fairchaeallaigh, “Public Participation and Environmental Impact Assessment:
Purposes, Implications, and Lessons for Public Policy Making” (2010) 30:1 Environmental Impact
Assessment Rev 19 at 22.
36. It contrasts with aggregative democracy, through which public decisions gain legitimacy through

874 The Dalhousie Law Journal

democratic decision-making is the giving and receiving of publicregarding reasons for public decisions.37 Thus a good outcome for public
decision-making, from this perspective, is a decision that is justified
through accessible and reasonable reasons to those who are subject to its
effects.38 Deliberation is a mode of decision-making in which process and
substance are fused. As leading scholars of deliberative democracy put it:
“What reasons count as such a justification is inescapably a substantive
question.”39
Deliberative democrats argue that deliberation enhances legitimacy,
encourages public-regarding perspectives by participants, promotes mutual
respect, and improves the quality of decisions.40 Building on these insights,
public law scholars argue that the exercise of public authority in a manner
that accords with deliberative-democratic principles is tied to legality.41
Deliberative decision-making thus explains how the administrative state
can operate with both democratic and legal authority.
From the scholarship on deliberative democracy, we can identify
three conditions that must be met to foster deliberative decision-making.42
The first is recognition that those affected have the capacity to contribute
to decisions affecting their interests; in other words, it is recognition of
their responsible agency.43 Individuals and communities are not passive
recipients of commands, rather they have agency with respect to collective
decisions. Their agency is respected when they can participate in the
debate and discussion about decisions that impact their interests. It is
further recognized when they have opportunities to contest (or accept)
those decisions.
vote-taking or other forms of aggregating individual preferences: Hoi L Kong, “Election Law and
Deliberative Democracy: Against Deflation” (2015) 9 JPPL 35 [Kong, “Election”].
37. Jocelyn Stacey, The Constitution of the Environmental Emergency (Oxford and Portland OR:
Hart Publishing, 2018), Chapter 4 [Stacey, Emergency].
38. A consensus-based outcome is always welcomed, but is not understood as a necessary or even
likely outcome of democratic deliberation: Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative
Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 26-29.
39. Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, “Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process” (2002) 10:2 J
Political Philosophy 153 at 156 [Gutmann & Thompson, “Beyond Process”].
40. Chambers, supra note 28 at 316.
41. David Dyzenhaus, “Deliberative Constitutionalism Through the Lens of the Administrative
State” in Ron Levy, Hoi Kong & Jeff King, eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 44; Liston “Democracy,” supra
note 27; Stacey, Emergency, supra note 37.
42. From a design perspective these three conditions roughly map onto Fung’s cube of participation:
Archon Fung, “Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance” (2006) 66 Public Administrative
Rev 66.
43. Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford and
Portland OR: Hart Publishing, 2012); Kong, “Election,” supra note 36 at 40. And building off these
sources: Stacey, Emergency, supra note 37 at 106-107.
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Second, deliberative decision-making requires an understanding of
mutual respect that flows from the act of deliberation. “To deliberate with
another is to understand the other as a self-authoring source of reasons
and claims.”44 Deliberation requires participants to be recognized and
respected as free and equal participants who ought to give and are entitled
to receive public-regarding reasons, not entirely self-interested claims.45
Mutual respect demands that deliberative forums are designed to foster
free and equal participation. Scholars have written extensively about these
conditions both in an ideal form46 and in specific cases (eg the design of
citizen assemblies).47 Mutual respect also requires that participants conduct
themselves as responsible agents by bringing relevant, public-regarding
claims. This is how discussion remains “aimed at producing reasonable,
well-informed opinions.”48
Finally, deliberative decision-making is reflexive.49 Responsible agents
who respect each other as such are willing to revise preferences. New
information and different perspectives ought to prompt participants—
including decision-makers—to reconsider and perhaps revise their own
opinions. The reason-giving requirement means that participants ought
to be able to articulate how they took that information into account to
justify their ultimate position. This requirement of reflexivity attaches to
all participants, but it has a particular importance when dealing with the
exercise of public authority. Public officials must give reasons to respond
to the claims made by those affected. Reflexivity respects the responsible
agency of those subject to the decision.50
These conditions of deliberation thus provide an internal structure for
publicly justified decisions. In a deliberative democracy, public decisionmakers must seek to fulfill these conditions in the first instance because
44. Jane Mansbridge et al, “A systemic approach to deliberative democracy” in John Parkinson &
Jane Mansbridge, eds, Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1 at 11.
45. For a summary of the literature on this point, see Polletta & Gardner, supra note 29 at 71-72.
On the relevance of this to Canadian public law see Liston “Democracy,” supra note 27 and Stacey,
Emergency, supra note 37.
46. Alice Woolley, “Legitimating Public Policy” (2008) 58:2 UTLJ 153; Henry S Richardson,
Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning About the Ends of Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002); Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in James Bohman & William Rehg,
eds, Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 73.
47. Chambers, supra note 28 at 316 (and citations therein).
48. Chambers, supra note 28 at 309.
49. Ibid at 308-309; Dryzek & Pickering, supra note 34.
50. Chambers, supra note 28 at 308 and 317; Gutmann & Thompson, “Beyond Process,” supra note
39 at 156. See also Genevieve Cartier, “Deliberative Ideals and Constitutionalism in the Administrative
State” in Ron Levy, Hoi Kong, Graeme Orr & Jeff King eds, The Cambridge Handbook of Deliberative
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 57 at 62-63.

876 The Dalhousie Law Journal

this is the source of their democratic and legal authority. When subject
to review, courts too must attend to these conditions.51 This reconciles
democratic authority with the rule of law.52
In sum, deliberative decision-making is supported as a form of
best practices for EA to improve both the legitimacy and quality of EA
decisions. Deliberative EA is grounded in a theory of public authority
that explains how EA decisions made by the administrative state can
fulfill both democratic and legal requirements. Moreover, this theory can
be distilled into three conditions that are essential to allow deliberative
decision-making to unfold.
II. Environmental law’s public law frames and their deliberative
dimensions
The duty of fairness, early Canadian EA regulation, and the DCA have
independent origins but all three inform the legislative structure and
operation of modern EA law. This part explains the connection between
modern EA and the common law duty of fairness, early EA as public
inquiry, and the DCA. For each public law frame, it highlights how the
existing doctrine has recognized the three conditions of deliberation. While
this recognition is both implicit and incomplete, it nonetheless provides a
coherent explanation of modern EA and has the potential to significantly,
and explicitly, inform the implementation and interpretation of modern
EA law.
1. Administrative law: The duty of fairness
a. EA as procedural fairness for the public
The first public law frame is the common law duty of fairness. The duty of
fairness guarantees those affected by a public decision a right to be heard
by an impartial decision-maker. Elizabeth Fisher writes that EA can be
understood as ensuring procedural fairness for the public:
The fact that EIA [environmental impact assessment] is a legal procedure
makes it both legally familiar and legally alien. It is familiar because
lawyers, particularly administrative lawyers, are well acquainted with
procedural obligations in the form of natural justice and procedural
fairness. It is alien because most such procedural obligations are focused
on protecting individual rights while EIA is a procedure in the public

51. This is reflected in current Canadian administrative law and its emphasis on justified
administrative decision-making: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019
SCC 65. See especially paras 2, 14, 74.
52. David Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture”
(1998) 14:1 SAJHR 11 at 36-37.

The Deliberative Dimensions of Modern
Environmental Assessment Law

877

interest.53

Fisher’s characterization applies in the Canadian context. While in Canada
the common law duty of fairness has not been extended to the public
generally,54 the public’s right to be heard has been a defining feature of
Canadian EA since its inception.55 Canada’s first EA legislation not only
allowed for public participation, but it also committed the government to
actively facilitating such input.56 Every version of federal EA legislation
has included “meaningful public participation” as one of its purposes.57 For
major project EAs, public participation has occurred through opportunities
for written comment at multiple points in the EA process and through
intervenor status at hearings. The importance of public participation to
EA is underscored by the significant backlash to 2012 legislative changes,
which for the first time curtailed the role of public input.58
Like the common law duty of fairness, the role of the public in EA
is two-fold: instrumental and intrinsic.59 First, members of the public are
often the source of relevant information about the environment and the
possible impacts of an approval decision. This information can enhance,
contest, or clarify the information presented by the project proponent.
NGOs and members of the public play an essential role in contesting
proponent evidence and thus provide the decision-maker with a much

53. Fisher, “Setting the Law Ablaze,” supra note 1 at 425.
54. Liston, “Democracy,” supra note 27. Compare with developments in the UK: R (on the
application of Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey, [2014] UKSC 56, especially Lord Wilson;
John Morison, “Citizen Participation: A Critical Look at the Democratic Adequacy of Government
Consultations” (2017) 37:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 636.
55. A John Sinclair & Alan P Diduck, “Public Participation in Canadian Environmental Assessment:
Enduring Challenges and Future Directions” in Kevin S Hanna, ed, Environmental Impact Assessment:
Practice and Participation, 3rd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2016) 65. Though it has
consistently fallen short of expectations. See Meinhard Doelle & A John Sinclair “Time for a New
Approach to Public Participation in EA: Promoting Cooperation and Consensus for Sustainability”
(2006) 26:2 Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 185 at 186-187. For a detailed literature review
of the meaning and role of public participation in EA see: Anne N Glucker et al, “Public Participation
in Environmental Impact Assessment: Why, Who and How?” (2013) 43 Environmental Impact
Assessment Rev 104.
56. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, Preamble, ss 4(1)(d), 62(g) [CEAA
1995].
57. Ibid, s 4(1)(d); Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52, s 4(e); IAA,
supra note 19, s 6(1)(h).
58. Gibson, “In Full Retreat,” supra note 23 at 180, 183-184; Geoffrey H Salomons & George
Hoberg, “Setting Boundaries of Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment” (2014) 45
Environmental Impact Assessment Rev 69; Kirsten Mikadze, “Pipelines and the Changing Face of
Public Participation” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac 83.
59. See eg Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643 at 659-660, 24 DLR (4th) 44
[Cardinal].
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fuller picture of the assessment.60 Second, the scale of the projects subject
to EA means that members of the public are affected either directly or
indirectly by these public decisions. Accordingly, EA affords them a right
to be heard before a decision is made that affects their interests. This is the
intrinsic justification for public participation—it recognizes the autonomy
and agency of those affected.61 The instrumental and intrinsic justifications
for participation are often captured by the language of legitimacy.62 When
EA functions well through a fair process, it contributes to the legitimacy of
development project decisions. Similarly, and independent of any effect on
the substantive outcome, the duty of fairness contributes to the legitimacy
of the administrative process.63
These similarities suggest that understanding EA as procedural fairness
for the public is an apt way of explaining the unusual structure of EA
and the elusive content of legislative provisions prescribing engagement
with affected communities. As the next section shows, watershed judicial
decisions on the common law duty of fairness contain the deliberative
conditions delineated above.
b. Deliberative conditions in the duty of fairness
This part examines the common law duty of fairness exemplified in the
UK decision in Cooper v Board of Works64 and the leading SCC decision
in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).65 Cooper is
an 1863 Court of Common Pleas decision that is said to foreshadow the
Canadian duty of fairness by over a century.66 In Baker, the SCC solidified
the doctrine of the duty of fairness and, in doing so, supplied a remarkably
stable precedent for this area of administrative law.
The facts of Cooper are simple. The Board of Works ordered the
demolition of Cooper’s partially-built home without affording Cooper any
notice or opportunity to be heard before making the decision. Cooper was
notified of the decision only upon discovering his demolished home. The
60. Susan Rutherford & Karen Campbell, “Time Well Spent? A Survey of Public Participation in
Federal Environmental Assessment Panels” (2004) 15:1 J Envtl L & Prac 71.
61. Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011) at 185-186.
62. Sinclair & Diduck, supra note 55 at 65; Mark Winfield, “Decision-Making, Governance and
Sustainability: Beyond the Age of ‘Responsible Resource Development’” (2016) 29 J Envtl L & Prac
129.
63. Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 1999 SCC 699 at para 22, 174 DLR
(4th) 193 [Baker]; Cardinal, supra note 59 at 661.
64. Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863), 14 CB (NS) 180, 143 ER 414 [Cooper].
65. Baker, supra note 63.
66. Gus Van Harten, Gerald Heckman, David Mullan & Janna Promislow eds, Administrative Law:
Cases, Text, and Materials 7th ed (Toronto: Emond Publishing, 2015) at 74.
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relevant legislation required that persons provide the Board notice before
building a new home; Cooper claimed he provided notice. The Board
claimed that Cooper did not and, accordingly, the legislation authorized
the demolition of his home. The Court unanimously held that Cooper
was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the Board’s
demolition decision, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation was silent
on the process to be afforded to individuals. Notably, Chief Justice Erle
refused to rest his judgment solely on a characterization of the decision as
“judicial.”67 It is this rejection of categorization and embrace of a broader
notion of fairness that is said to be the precursor to the contemporary
Canadian duty of fairness.
The Chief Justice’s reasons focus on the significant power exercised by
the Board and the lack of harm that would come from the Board “hearing
the party before they subjected him to a loss so serious.”68 There is a clear
connection here with the first deliberative condition: respect for Cooper’s
responsible agency. None of the judges viewed the requirement of fairness
as a mere procedural formality. Justices Willes and Byles added that the
absence of notice thwarted entirely Cooper’s ability to contest the adverse
decision (before demolition) using the appeals mechanisms set out in the
statute.69 By denying him the opportunity to actively accept or contest
the decision, Cooper was treated as a recipient of a command and not a
responsible agent capable of participating in the decision-making process.
A closer reading of Cooper reveals the Court’s commitment to the two
further conditions for deliberation. Cooper was owed a duty of fairness
because of his interests at stake and also because he might have had
something relevant and useful to contribute to the decision to be made. The
judges had in mind an administrative process that fosters mutual respect.
That is, they had an expectation that both the Board and Cooper would
approach the process as an opportunity for forming reasonable positions
in light of the statutory scheme. For example, the Chief Justice speculated
that perhaps “[t]he default in sending notice… is a default which may be
explained.”70 It is not simply that Cooper will assert his right or interest
in his private property, but rather that he might put forth good reasons for
avoiding the demolition that are relevant to the statutory scheme.
Justice Krating states this expectation even more strongly and connects
it to an obligation on the part of the Board. He suggests that if Cooper
67.
68.
69.
70.

Cooper, supra note 64 at 418.
Ibid at 417-418.
Ibid at 419-420.
Ibid at 417.
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had the opportunity to assure the Board that construction proceeded in
a manner that protected the public interest, “can any one suppose for a
moment that the board would have proceeded to inflict upon the man the
grievous injury of demolishing his house[?]”71 Justice Krating articulates a
commitment to reflexivity. That is, requiring Cooper’s participation in the
process implies that the Board would be willing to adjust its decision in
accordance with the information and views presented by Cooper.
This closer read of Cooper suggests that the duty of fairness is not
simply concerned with protecting private rights from state interference.
Rather, the duty of fairness is concerned with good administration. The
Chief Justice reasons that a common law duty of fairness is “required by a
due consideration for the public interest” and that it provides “a great many
advantages which might arise in the way of public order.”72 While Chief
Justice Erle does not explicate his meaning here, the reasons as a whole
suggest that the public interest and public order is best served through
commitments to responsible agency, mutual respect, and reflexivity. On
this view, the private interests of Cooper are not pitted against the public
interest in proper sewage management and urban development. Rather, a
fair process is one in which affected parties offer public-regarding reasons
to a respectful and open-minded decision-maker. This interpretation—one
that contains the deliberative conditions—plausibly supplies a theory that
underpins the decision’s undefined objective of “substantial justice.”73
The principles of fairness articulated in Cooper laid largely dormant
in Canadian administrative law until the 1979 SCC decision in Nicholson
v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commission,74 in which a majority
of the Court supplemented the narrow common law doctrine of natural
justice with a broader duty of fairness. The Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed Nicholson, and the existence of the broader duty of fairness, six
years later in Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution.75
But it is the Court’s 1999 decision in Baker that is widely understood
to unlock the potential of the duty of fairness and that brings Canadian
law full circle to Cooper.76 The decision at issue was the denial of Baker’s
exemption from deportation requirements. Baker had been allowed to
make full written submissions to the decision-maker, with supporting
71. Ibid at 420.
72. Ibid at 418.
73. Ibid.
74. Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police Commissioners, [1979] 1 SCR 311, 88 DLR
(3d) 671.
75. Cardinal, supra note 59.
76. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v.
Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 195.
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documentation and assistance from legal counsel. After receiving the
adverse decision, Baker’s counsel requested reasons and received the notes
of a junior immigration officer involved in the decision-making process.
The notes were riddled with stereotypes and prejudice against Baker, a
Jamaican woman with a mental health condition and children in care. The
Court unanimously held that the participatory rights afforded to Baker and
her children were adequate, but that the decision was biased.77 A majority
of the Court also found the decision substantively unreasonable.78
There is abundant scholarship noting the remarkable features of
Baker.79 Here, I note only two of the striking features of the majority’s
reasons. First, the decision extends procedural protections to those whose
interests are affected by the decision. The Court is clear that the duty is not
solely about protecting the individual rights and liberties of those directly
subject to state action. Baker, the subject of the decision, was owed a duty
of fairness, but so were her children.80 The children’s best interests were at
stake and those interests were entitled to full and fair consideration. Thus the
decision-maker was required to provide an opportunity for the children’s
views to be fully and fairly presented and to consider these submissions
in making the decision.81 In this way, there are echoes of Cooper, in that
the duty of fairness is not simply about mediating the conflict between
individual and state, but rather, it is about ensuring a broader notion of
substantial justice. The duty of fairness goes hand-in-hand with public
order because it ensures that the interests of those impacted—whether the
subject of the decision or not—are considered and taken into account. In
this way, the Court inched the common law doctrine closer to the public’s
right to be heard, which is codified in EA statutes.
Second, Baker recognizes that the duty of fairness requires decisionmakers to offer reasons for their decisions in a wide range of instances.82
This reason-giving requirement encapsulates the conditions of mutual
respect, responsible agency, and reflexivity. It is through giving reasons
that the decision-maker shows respect for those affected by the decision;
it shows that the decision-maker has taken seriously their interests; and it

77. Baker, supra note 63 at paras 34, 78.
78. Ibid at para 76.
79. See eg David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, supra note 76; David Dyzenhaus, ed, The Unity of
Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Alyssa Clutterbuck, “Rethinking Baker: A Critical Race
Feminist Theory of Disability” (2015) 20 Appeal 51.
80. Baker, supra note 63 at paras 30, 34.
81. Ibid at para 22.
82. Ibid at para 43.
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provides those affected the opportunity to exercise their agency in either
accepting or contesting the decision.
The reason-giving requirement erodes the distinction between
procedural and substantive justice.83 The obligation to provide reasons is
a matter of procedural fairness, but is closely linked to concerns about
the substance, or contents, of the reasons offered in support of a decision.
The Baker majority observed that reasons can lead to better decisions by
forcing the decision-maker to think through the rationale. In addition, the
majority noted that reasons facilitate judicial scrutiny.84 This proved true
in Baker: the decision was found unreasonable because the notes revealed
the decision was “completely dismissive of the interests of Ms. Baker’s
children,” contrary to the statutory scheme.85
Implicit in the majority’s reasoning is concern for deliberative
conditions. Baker may have made submissions, as a responsible agent,
but she was not treated with respect by the decision-maker. The notes
demonstrated that the decision was influenced by the immigration officer’s
prejudice. Moreover, the notes revealed the absence of reflexivity, or, a
willingness on the part of the decision-maker to be persuaded by better
reason. Here, the decision advanced a preconceived position, riddled as it
was with stereotypes and prejudice. It was not responsive to the concerns
advanced by those affected.
This part has highlighted that, among many important features of
Baker, the decision re-articulates a robust understanding of fairness seen
in the much earlier decision in Cooper. The duty of fairness relied upon
by both courts implicitly contains conditions for deliberative decisionmaking. The duty of fairness requires that those impacted by the decision
be treated as responsible agents capable of participating in the decisionmaking and law-making process. Respect for those affected means a
“meaningful opportunity” to be heard and to have their claims “fully
and fairly considered.”86 It also means that participants have a reciprocal
obligation to provide relevant, public-regarding reasons for their claims.
Finally, respect for the agency of those affected requires the decisionmaker to be reflexive, that is, open to persuasion and responsive to the
reasons advanced by those affected.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 76.
Baker, supra note 63 at para 39.
Ibid at para 65.
Ibid at para 32.
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2. Regulation: early Canadian EA
a. EA as public inquiry in miniature
Along with the common law duty of fairness, early EA regulation and
practice informs our understanding of modern EA law. One of the most
significant assessments in Canadian history is the Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline Inquiry. Transformative both domestically87 and internationally,88
and an early precursor to modern EA and the DCA, the 1974–1977 inquiry
assessed the impacts of a proposed oil and gas corridor in Canada’s north.
Justice Thomas Berger led the inquiry. As this part shows, his innovative
implementation of the inquiry influenced early Canadian EA regulation
and fulfilled the three deliberative conditions of responsible agency,
mutual respect, and reflexivity.
The Inquiry’s terms of reference mirrored the set of considerations
now associated with EA.89 Berger grasped the stakes of this proposal and
his mandate in leading the inquiry. “[I]mplicit in this mandate,” Berger
wrote, is that the inquiry “is not simply a debate about a gas pipeline
and an energy corridor, it is a debate about the future of the North and
its peoples.”90 Given these stakes, he described his “anxiety” to ensure
“that the people of the North and all other Canadians with an interest in
the work of the Inquiry should have every opportunity to be heard.”91 He
wrote, “[w]e wished to create an Inquiry without walls.”92
Berger was empowered to hold hearings, summon witnesses, compel
the production of documents, and “to adopt such practices and procedures
for all purposes of the inquiry as he from time to time deems expedient
for the proper conduct thereof.”93 But there was no specific legislated
requirement or judicial precedent for the practices and procedures that
Berger adopted. Instead, Berger adopted innovative and celebrated
methods94 following the lead of northern communities.
87. Frances Abele, “The Lasting Impact of the Berger Inquiry into the Construction of a Pipeline in
the Mackenzie Valley” in Gregory J Inwood & Carolyn M Johns, eds, Commissions of Inquiry and
Policy Change: A Comparative Analysis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) 88 at 90.
88. Notably its influence on the design and operation of the Waitangi Tribunal in New Zealand/
Aotearoa: Kim Stanton, Truth Commissions and Public Inquiries: Addressing Historical Injustices in
Established Democracies (SJD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2010) at 212-213.
89. Mandate Letter, PC 1974-641, (21 March 1974), C Gaz II [Mandate Letter].
90. Thomas R Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland: The Report of the Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline Inquiry (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 1977) at 1 [Inquiry].
91. Ibid at 241.
92. Ibid at 228.
93. Mandate Letter, supra note 89.
94. Stanton, supra note 88 at 151; Robert Page, Northern Development: The Canadian Dilemma
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), Chapter 5; Abele, supra note 87 at 89; Alastair R Lucas,
“The Berger Inquiry and the Committee for Justice and Liberty Case” in William A Tilleman &
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In particular, the Inquiry made community participation central to
the entire endeavour. The inquiry was structured with both community
hearings and formal hearings with technical experts, and with mechanisms
to ensure participants all had access to the same information.95 The two
sets of hearings were run as complementary processes and given an
equal role in the inquiry.96 Berger successfully sought and implemented a
funding program for those who would make a “necessary and substantial
contribution” and who would not otherwise have the financial resources
to participate.97 Moreover, the hearings travelled to the communities
and adopted informal and flexible procedures that avoided unnecessary
adversarial, legal techniques.98
The Inquiry attained another distinctive achievement: it produced
a best-selling final report.99 The report details the careful attention to
process and it arrives at a creative compromise in its recommendation—
the clear product of the process. Berger recommended that no pipeline
should be built across the uniquely vulnerable Northern Yukon and, while
it was environmentally feasible to build a pipeline through the Mackenzie
Valley, it should be postponed for ten years to allow for the government to
negotiate land claims with the Indigenous Peoples in the north.100
The Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry remains the gold standard
for assessment that many have relied on to advocate for more inclusive
and comprehensive planning processes for land and resource decisionmaking.101 Despite never being fully replicated, the Inquiry influenced
the structure of early Canadian EA regulation. The first federal policy
on EA, the Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP), was
issued the same year that Berger was given his mandate. The 1974 EARP
contained the objective of “giving environmental problems the same
degree of consideration as that given to economic, social, engineering and
other concerns,” but it did not incorporate a significant role for public
participation.102 The Inquiry, however, galvanized public interest in EA,
Alastair R Lucas, eds, Litigating Canada’s Environment: Leading Canadian Environmental Cases by
the Lawyers Involved (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2017) 69.
95. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 224.
96. Stanton, supra note 88 at 167.
97. Inquiry, supra note 90 at 225-226.
98. Ibid at 226-227.
99. Stanton, supra note 88 at 182 (and footnotes therein).
100. Inquiry, supra note 90 at xxvi-xxvii (Letter to the Minister).
101. Robert B Gibson & Kevin S Hanna, “Progress and Uncertainty: The Evolution of Federal
Environmental Assessment in Canada” in Kevin S Hanna, ed, Environmental Impact Assessment:
Practice and Participation, 3rd ed (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2016) 15 at 19.
102. Provisions of the Policy of the Government of Canada Establishing the Federal Environmental
Assessment and Review Process (Ottawa: Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office,
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generated criticism of the original EARP, and resulted in policy changes.
These changes emphasized the role of public participation throughout the
assessment process and strengthened the independence of public panel
reviews.103
Implementation of the EARP was uneven, but updates continued
to strengthen its language. By 1984, when the EARP was formalized
as a “Guidelines Order” (EARPGO), a legally-binding regulation,104
it included several of Berger’s participatory innovations. EARPGO
documents emphasized the role of public participation at all stages of
environmental assessment.105 Panel reviews (what were and remain
the most comprehensive form of assessment for larger projects) were
designed to make public participation central to the exercise.106 Emulating
the Inquiry’s community hearings, and the understanding that public
participation must be actively facilitated, the EARPGO required that
“[a]ll hearings of a Panel shall be public hearings conducted in a nonjudicial and informal but structured manner”107 with the goal to “encourage
the broadest public participation.”108 Multiple community hearings were
the norm for panel reviews, with separate “issue meetings” convened for
interested parties to address specific, controversial issues.109 Beginning
in 1990, EA implementation was supported by a formalized participant
funding program with criteria for eligibility similar to the those used by
Berger.110
The EARPGO, in some ways, seemed to conceive of panel reviews
as miniature public inquiries. The courts agreed that facilitating public
participation was a central objective of the EA process.111 As noted above,
once federal EA was enacted as legislation, public participation was

1974), ss 1(d), 5(b)(vi).
103. Doelle, supra note 12 at 8; Robert Gibson, “From Wreck Cove to Voisey’s Bay: The Evolution
of Federal Environmental Assessment in Canada” (2002) 20:3 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal
151 at 154.
104. Can Wildlife Fed Inc v Can (Minister of the Environment), [1989] 3 FC 309, [1989] 4 WWR 526
at 537-538; Oldman, supra note 9.
105. See eg The Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (Ottawa: Federal
Environmental Assessment Review Office, 1987) at 2-3 [Guideline 1987].
106. Oldman, supra note 9.
107. Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, s 27(1) in Rodney Northey,
The 1995 Annotated Canada Environmental Assessment Act and EARP Guidelines Order (Toronto:
Thomson Canada, 1994).
108. Ibid at 4.
109. Environmental Assessment Panels: What they are and What they do (Ottawa, Government of
Canada, Environmental Assessment Review, 1980) at 7; Guideline 1987, supra note 105 at 4.
110. Northey, supra note 107 at 577.
111. Ibid.
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entrenched as one of its core purposes.112 The Inquiry had made its imprint
on early EA regulation. As the next section argues, the Inquiry’s design
met the three conditions of deliberative decision-making.
b. The deliberative features of the inquiry and its influence
Berger understood the Inquiry as an exercise in deliberative democracy,
one that cultivated social learning and shared values through the
integration of robust participation and formal expertise. In the report, he
wrote: “Commissions of Inquiry have begun to take on a new function:
that of opening up issues to public discussion, of providing a forum for
the exchange of ideas.”113 For Berger, proper process flowed from this
understanding:
If commissions of inquiry have become an important means for public
participation in democratic decision-making as well as an instrument to
supply informed advice to government, it is important to consider the
way in which inquiries are conducted and whether they have the means
to fulfill their perceived functions.114

Indeed, the Inquiry fulfilled the three deliberative conditions introduced
above. It was a process that treated those affected as responsible, selfdetermining agents, it afforded them respect and cultivated mutual respect
amongst participants, and it demonstrated reflexivity.
First, Berger’s understanding of those affected as responsible agents is
demonstrated by how he included their input. The Inquiry did not passively
create an opportunity for northern participation, rather it actively facilitated
that participation. It sought to meet those affected on their terms.115 “We
tried to bring the Inquiry to the people. This meant it was the Inquiry,
and the representatives of the media accompanying it—not the people of
the North—that were obliged to travel.”116 The travelling Inquiry heard
anyone who wanted to be heard and stayed in the northern communities
as long as it needed to stay. The Inquiry allowed those impacted to make
submissions in their own way. It employed translators so that Indigenous
Peoples could speak in their own languages. It shed unnecessarily formal
and legalistic procedures.117
Notably, this did not come at the expense of others affected by the
decision. Berger recognized the responsible agency of those in southern
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

CEAA 1995, supra note 56, s 4(d).
Inquiry, supra note 90 at 223.
Ibid at 224.
Ibid at 227.
Ibid at 228.
Stanton, supra note 88 at 189.
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Canada as well. He took the view that those in the south deserved to
hear and understand the anticipated impacts on the north.118 Berger
observed, “this was a public inquiry. The things that were said were the
public’s business….”119 He held hearings in the south.120 These hearings
were accompanied by a sophisticated media strategy for disseminating
information about the Inquiry.121
Berger’s commitment to mutual respect was clear through his careful
attentiveness to how a “fair and complete” inquiry must enable the
participation of those affected and those interests that might not otherwise
be represented.122 He sought, in other words, to ensure that those affected
were treated as free and equal. An independent committee provided
scientific evidence that was available to all.123 Berger deployed nonadversarial mechanisms for disclosure of documents so they were available
to all participants.124 He provided participant funding.125 These procedures
were all essential to ensure that lay participants were on equal terms with
professionals and technical experts and to enable mutual exchange.
Berger’s insistence that “the formal hearings and the community
hearings should be regarded as equally important parts of the same
process”126 nicely illustrates the Inquiry’s commitment to mutual respect.
While the procedures for each set of hearings were tailored to the particular
focus (community knowledge and experience versus technical expertise),
the two were held concurrently and were mutually informing. Berger
noted “[t]he contributions of ordinary people were… important in the
assessment of even the most technical subjects.”127 Indigenous knowledge
of the land was integral to assessing impacts on caribou, the vulnerability
of the Beaufort Sea to oil spills, and the effect of frost heave on pipeline
construction and operation.128 Reflecting the generative potential of
deliberation, Berger concluded: “It became increasingly obvious that the
issue of impact assessment is much greater than the sum of its constituent
parts.”129
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Ibid at 172.
Inquiry, supra note 90 at 228.
Ibid.
Stanton, supra note 88 at 172.
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Finally, Berger’s commitment to reflexivity was demonstrated
throughout his detailed report, which captured distinctive perspectives
of the north as “homeland” and as “frontier.” Reflexivity was also
demonstrated through Berger’s interpretation of the Inquiry mandate to
allow for the consideration of Indigenous land claims. Early in the process
the Inuit, Métis, and Dene advanced the position that there could be no
approval of a pipeline right-of-way until land settlement agreements were
concluded with the Crown.130 Berger understood this claim to be “an
essential focus for the natives’ case regarding the impact of the pipeline
and their way of life.”131 The process that he adopted was responsive to
this central concern. He interpreted his mandate to allow for consideration
of whether the pipeline could be “built without prejudice to the settlement
of native land claims.”132 After hearing all the evidence, Berger concluded
that it could not and, thus, recommended a 10-year moratorium on
pipeline development in the Mackenzie Valley to allow for settlement
negotiations.133
While EA legislation has changed considerably over time, the historical
context of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry and its influence on early
EA regulatory structure helps explain the centrality of public participation
to EA and the unwavering public expectation and demand for robust
inclusion in these processes. Moreover, as we have seen, this early history
demonstrates a real attention to the deliberative conditions of responsible
agency, mutual respect, and reflexivity through innovative regulatory
design.
3. Constitutional law: The duty to consult and accommodate
a. EA as framework for the duty to consult and accommodate
The third public law frame that clarifies EA legislation is its role as one of
the main statutory regimes for implementing the DCA. While the DCA is
a constitutional obligation owed by the Crown, the SCC has readily and
repeatedly endorsed the use of statutory regimes, such as EA legislation, to
fulfill this obligation to Indigenous Peoples.134 This section explains how
EA and the DCA are connected legally and in implementation.

130. Ibid at 244.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid at 198.
134. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC
74 at para 2 [TRTFN]; CR, supra note 14 at paras 30-33 (addressing the related statutory process for
assessment under the Canadian Oil and Gas Operations Act); Chippewas of the Thames First Nation
v Enbridge Pipelines Inc, 2017 SCC 41 at paras 32-34 [Chippewas].
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The DCA doctrine is highly contextual, tailored to the specific impacts
of specific Crown action on specific Aboriginal groups. It therefore has
multiple legal steps. First, the Crown must determine if the DCA is
triggered. The duty is engaged “when the Crown has knowledge, real or
constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect it.”135 When engaged,
the Crown must next determine the scope of the duty owed. The Court
describes “the scope of the duty [as] proportionate to a preliminary
assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right
or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the
right or title claimed.”136 This second step requires the Crown to conduct
a strength of claim analysis and share this information with the affected
Aboriginal group.137 The third step is consultation itself, discussed in more
depth below. A minimal DCA involves Crown notice and disclosure of
information. Deep consultation, however, involves robust engagement
“aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution.”138 Finally, the Court
states that in some circumstances consultation will lead to accommodation,
which requires the Crown to “[take] steps to avoid irreparable harm or to
minimize the effects of infringement.”139
Craik observes that there is a “pragmatic attractiveness” to treating
EA and the DCA as complementary, “since much of the information
and analysis of the environmental effects of a proposed activity will be
required to assess the impacts of that same activity on Aboriginal rights and
interests.”140 Information collected through the EA informs the Crown’s
determination of the scope of the duty, forms the basis for discussions
with Aboriginal groups during the consultation and suggests possibilities
for accommodation (usually in the form of mitigation measures.)141
Conversely, the sharing of Indigenous knowledge and expertise through the
consultation should inform the Crown’s understanding of the environmental
and social impacts of the proposed project and the application of the legal
tests required under EA legislation.142
135. Haida, supra note 7 at para 35.
136. Ibid at para 39.
137. Wii’litswx v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2008 BCSC 1139; Saugeen First Nation v
Ontario (MNRF), 2017 ONSC 3456 at para 61; Gitxaala, supra note 24 at paras 305-308.
138. Haida, supra note 7 at paras 43-44.
139. Ibid at para 47. For a detailed analysis of the DCA see Dwight G Newman, Revisiting the Duty
to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon, SK: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2014) at 27-28.
140. Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 633.
141. See eg the phased approach used for the Trans Mountain Pipeline assessment: Tsleil-Waututh
Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 153 at paras 74-75 [TWN].
142. See TRTFN, supra note 134.
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In addition to practical overlap, EAs are themselves Crown conduct
that trigger the DCA. This is true of decisions made throughout the EA
process, from high-level scoping EA decisions143 to final decisions on
project approval. It is also true of decisions made by government agencies144
as well as Ministers and Governor in Council.145 Moreover, the BC Court
of Appeal has held that, given the significance of EA decision-making for
land and resource management, EA must include Aboriginal consultation,
even if there is a separate process for engaging with affected Aboriginal
groups.146 EA and the DCA are legally intertwined.147
The Crown also views these processes as necessarily interconnected,
which is reflected in federal and provincial policy guidance: “since 2006,
the Government of Canada has relied, to the extent possible, on the
federal environmental assessment process to fulfill the duty to consult and
accommodate, as appropriate.”148 Canada has produced numerous policy
documents to guide Indigenous “participation” in EA.149 Similarly, BC
policy documents presume integration between EA and the DCA.150
143. CS, supra note 15 at paras 44, 47; Kwikwetlem First Nation v British Columbia (Utilities
Commission), 2009 BCCA 68 at para 70.
144. CR, supra note 14 at para 29; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Nova Scotia (Utility and Review
Board), 2019 NSCA 66 at paras 101-103.
145. See eg Gitxaala, supra note 24.
146. Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council v British Columbia (Environmental Assessment Office),
2011 BCCA 78 at paras 97-98.
147. See Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 for a detailed analysis of these interconnections.
148. Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Policy Context: Assessment of Potential Impacts on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 15 January 2020), online:
Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policyguidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/assessment-potential-impacts-rights-indigenouspeoples.html> [https://perma.cc/LT8M-DNQ9].
149. Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Interim Guidance: Indigenous Participation in Impact
Assessment” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 16 December 2019), online: Government of Canada
<https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-guidance/practitionersguide-impact-assessment-act/interim-guidance-indigenous-participation-ia.html>
[https://perma.
cc/DCP7-56Q5] [“Indigenous Participation”]; Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Interim Policy
Context: Indigenous Participation in Impact Assessment” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 27
August 2019), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/
services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/interim-policy-indigenousparticipation-ia.html> [https://perma.cc/US6L-R2V7]; Canada, Impact Assessment Agency,
“Interim Guidance: Collaboration with Indigenous Peoples in Impact Assessments” (Ottawa: Impact
Assessment Agency, 16 January 2020), online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/
en/impact-assessment-agency/services/policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessmentact/collaboration-indigenous-peoples-ia.html>
[https://perma.cc/PJ5W-S3HQ]
[“Indigenous
Collaboration”]; Canada, Impact Assessment Agency, “Interim Guidance: Assessment of Potential
Impacts on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (Ottawa: Impact Assessment Agency, 16 January 2020),
online: Government of Canada <https://www.canada.ca/en/impact-assessment-agency/services/
policy-guidance/practitioners-guide-impact-assessment-act/interim-guidance-assessment-potentialimpacts-rights-indigenous-peoples.html> [https://perma.cc/B6RE-MBTP].
150. British Columbia, Environmental Assessment Office, Guide to Involving Proponents when
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The apparent complementarity between EA and the DCA often breaks
down in practice, however, giving rise to complex and highly contextual
disputes and legal issues. For example, despite the Crown’s reliance on
EA for DCA purposes, the process of the EA is often defined to exclude
matters of crucial import to Indigenous Peoples and the exercise of
Aboriginal and treaty rights.151 Aspects of the DCA get parcelled out
across government actors,152 creating tension with Aboriginal groups who
are prevented from effectively conversing with decision-makers about
their concerns.153 Government agencies fail to fulfill the DCA because they
confuse essential distinctions between environmental impacts and impacts
on Aboriginal rights.154 And ambiguity remains over whether Aboriginal
groups, government, or industry proponents bear the onus of substantiating
concerns about anticipated environmental impacts that impinge proven or
claimed Aboriginal or treaty rights.155
The on-the-ground operation of EA as a framework for the DCA
is highly complex and often fraught. As described in next section, the
courts have nonetheless developed and enforced a set of legal obligations
governing the exercise of public authority in these contexts. Moreover,
the judicially-developed DCA recognizes—albeit incompletely—the three
conditions of deliberative decision-making.
b. The deliberative features of the duty to consult and accommodate
This section identifies the strongest attributes of the DCA and their
deliberative potential, while recognizing that, even in its best light, the
DCA is highly constrained.156 Indeed the close connection between EA
and the DCA in practice may contribute to the DCA’s narrowness. When
combined with EA, affected Aboriginal and treaty rights are framed as
simply another set of inputs for the assessment, rather than the impetus for
coproduction of knowledge and shared decision-making. EA thus helps to
Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process (Victoria: Environmental
Assessment Office, December 2013), online (pdf): <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/
natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/first-nations/proponents_guide_fn_
consultation_environmental_assessment_process_dec2013.pdf> [https://perma.cc/WP8M-ZKWR];
British Columbia, Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation, Guide to Involving Proponents
when Consulting First Nations (Victoria: Ministry of Indigenous Relations and Reconciliation,
December 2014), online (pdf): <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resourcestewardship/consulting-with-first-nations/first-nations/involving_proponents_guide_when_
consulting_with_first_nations.pdf> [https://perma.cc/P5H8-SEYP].
151. See eg TWN, supra note 141 (on the exclusion of marine shipping).
152. See Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 665.
153. See eg Gitxaala, supra note 24 at para 279; TWN, supra note 141 at para 562.
154. CR, supra note 14 at para 45.
155. Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 5§2020-2030.
156. Christie, supra note 8 at 154; Hanson, supra note 8 at 12-13.
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position the DCA alongside the other two public law frames as a decisionmaking procedure within Canadian public law, rather than as a rightsaffirming doctrine with the potential to mediate across legal orders.157
It is possible, nonetheless, to see the courts articulating and actively
developing deliberative conditions in the DCA doctrine, even though they
often stop well short of giving them full effect. This section draws out
those deliberative conditions from the SCC’s formative decision in Haida
and surrounding DCA jurisprudence. In addition, it highlights an example
of how these deliberative conditions have been misunderstood by the
courts. This example underscores the importance of making explicit the
conditions on which the court relies to guide its understanding of DCA.
The Court’s description of consultation shares the basic features
of deliberation introduced in Part I. Haida defines consultation in the
following terms: “‘[C]onsultation’ in its least technical definition is
talking together for mutual understanding.”158 The Court adopts from
New Zealand policy the idea that “[c]onsultation is not just a process
of exchanging information. It also entails testing and being prepared to
amend policy proposals in the light of information received, and providing
feedback.”159 It describes a reciprocal relationship in which participants
engage in a search for a reasonable outcome that takes into account the
reasons and views of each other. Consultation, as described in Haida, is
not a one-way transfer of information from one party to another. Nor is
it a straight-forward balancing of fixed preferences of the participants.
Rather consultation, on this view, is potentially transformative, where
the outcomes generated from the consultation are a unique product of the
process.160
The deliberative condition of responsible agency is encapsulated by
the Crown’s obligation to consult with Indigenous Peoples in their unique
capacity as claimants of Aboriginal and treaty rights.161 The DCA cannot be
fulfilled by treating Indigenous Peoples simply as another stakeholder in a
decision with broader public consequences. Haida clarifies that Indigenous
Peoples are entitled to a decision-making process that is distinctive from
what the ordinary duty of fairness requires and that may generate different

157. See Hamilton & Nichols, supra note 8 for a proposal on how the DCA could transform into this.
158. Haida, supra note 7 at para 43, quoting Thomas Isaac & Anthony Knox, “The Crown’s Duty to
Consult Aboriginal People” (2003) 41:1 Alta L Rev 49 at 61; CR, supra note 14 at para 49.
159. Haida, supra note 7 at para 46, quoting New Zealand, Ministry of Justice, A Guide for
Consultation with Mäori (Wellington:The Ministry, 1997).
160. Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 673.
161. Haida, supra note 7 at para 51; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian
Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at para 64 [Mikisew].
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outcomes than ordinary equitable remedies such as interim injunctions.162
This flows from the distinctive stakes in land and resource decisions for
Indigenous Peoples.163 This distinctiveness is again recognized by the
Court when it holds that fulfilling the duty to consult is “a special public
interest that supersedes other concerns.”164
The commitment to mutual respect between Crown and Indigenous
Peoples flows from the honour of the Crown.165 At its core, the honour
of the Crown seems to entail a stance of respect for Indigenous Peoples
in Canada.166 For example, communication by the Crown to Indigenous
Peoples must foster mutual understanding.167 Respect is also required in
that the Crown has a clear and legally-enforceable obligation to conduct a
strength of claim analysis and to share that information with the affected
Aboriginal group.168 The strength of claim analysis ensures that Crown
consultation is tailored to the specific impacts on the individual Aboriginal
group. Sharing that information creates the platform for fostering dialogue,
recognized within the existing doctrinal frame.169
Moreover, Haida is clear that this respect must be mutual: “At all
stages, good faith on both sides is required.”170 Hard bargaining is
acceptable, according to the Court, when it takes place within the broader
understanding of reconciliation and the honour of the Crown. The vision
presented by the Court reflects deliberative theories that value plural
modes of reason giving and moments of bargaining or rhetoric, provided
they take place within a broader commitment of the parties to deliberative
democracy.171
Implicit in the Haida definition of consultation is the condition of
reflexivity. Because consultation is not simply the exchange of information
or, as the Court later states, “an opportunity to blow off steam,”172 Crown
decision-makers have an obligation to revise decisions in light of the
consultation process. For deep consultation, the Federal Court of Appeal
has stated that “a dialogue must ensue and the dialogue should lead to a
demonstrably serious consideration of accommodation. The Crown must
162. Haida, supra note 7 at para 13.
163. Ibid at para 7.
164. CR, supra note 14 at para 40.
165. Newman, supra note 139 at 27-28.
166. Ibid at 167.
167. CR, supra note 14 at para 49.
168. Supra note 137.
169. Gitxaala, supra note 24 at paras 308-309.
170. Haida, supra note 7 at para 42.
171. Chambers, supra note 28 at 309, 322.
172. Mikisew, supra note 161 at para 54; West Moberly First Nation v British Columbia (Chief
Inspector of Mines), 2011 BCCA 247 at para 149 [WMFN].
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be prepared to make changes to its proposed actions.”173 While Haida is
clear that consultative obligations are varied and that the requirement of
accommodation may not always arise, it is equally clear that the “common
thread on the Crown’s part must be ‘the intention of substantially addressing
[Aboriginal] concerns’ as they are raised…through a meaningful process
of consultation.”174
Reflexivity is further presumed by the requirement that consultation
occur at the stage that can actually influence the outcome. In Haida, the
Court determined that “to be meaningful,” consultation must take place
on higher-level, strategic decisions which set the course for subsequent
operational decisions.175 At least for major projects, this has been extended
to consultation on the macro-level design of the EA process itself.176
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that early consultation is essential,
otherwise “there is clear momentum to allow a project.”177
The condition of reflexivity is enforced through the obligation to give
reasons for the decision. Reason giving is a crucial expression of respect
for the receiving party, which has added significance in the Crown’s
process of reconciliation. As the SCC has stated:
Written reasons foster reconciliation by showing affected Indigenous
[P]eoples that their rights were considered and addressed… Reasons
are ‘a sign of respect [which] displays the requisite comity and courtesy
becoming the Crown as Sovereign toward a prior occupying [N]ation’…
Written reasons also promote better decision making.178

The Court ends this passage with a nod to the internal substantive
constraints of reason giving. Not just any reasons will fulfill the
Crown’s obligations. The courts have held in this context that reasons
must show that “representations are seriously considered and, wherever
possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action.”179
173. TWN, supra note 141 at para 564.
174. Haida, supra note 7 at para 42, quoting Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at
para 168, 153 DLR (4th) 193.
175. Haida, supra note 7 at para 76.
176. Dene Tha’ First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment), 2006 FC 1354 at para 107.
177. The Squamish Nation et al v The Minister of Sustainable Resource Management et al, 2004
BCSC 1320 at para 74.
178. CR, supra note 14 at para 41, citing to Haida, supra note 7 at para 44; Kainaiwa/Blood Tribe v
Alberta (Energy), 2017 ABQB 107 at para 117 and Baker, supra note 63 at para 39. See also WMFN,
supra note 172 at para 148, where the BCCA puts it a bit more plainly, stating WMFN was entitled
to “a satisfactory, reasoned explanation as to why their position was not accepted”; Squamish First
Nation v Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2019 FCA 216 at paras 64, 75-79 [Squamish 2019].
179. Halfway River First Nation v British Columbia (Ministry of Forests), 1999 BCCA 470 at para
160, adopted in Mikisew 2005, supra note 161 at 64; applied in WMFN, supra note 172 at paras 145146.
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An obligation to show that the concerns of Aboriginal groups have been
integrated into the decision provides at least a baseline substantive test
for the DCA.180 Demonstrable integration is consistent with the dialogic
nature of consultation that the Court in Haida seems to have in mind
and that is picked up explicitly in later decisions by the Federal Court of
Appeal, which demand of the Crown responsive reasons.181 At its best, the
DCA encapsulates the three deliberative conditions and, like deliberative
decision-making, fuses procedural and substantive demands.182
While the three deliberative conditions are immanent in DCA
jurisprudence, they are imperfectly realized.183 For example, the courts
repeatedly invoke the statement that consultation does not create “a veto
over what can be done with land.”184 In this way the DCA mirrors the
common law duty of fairness and the distinction between process and
substance sustained in the common law.185
The deliberative conditions indicate that the veto language is
inappropriate. While it is true that deliberative decision-making means no
one substantive outcome can be presupposed in advance,186 it is inaccurate
to describe this as a veto. Rather it is a deliberative constraint that applies to
all participants in the decision-making process, including the Crown. Thus
the Courts must distinguish between general deliberative conditions and
the specific case. A deliberative understanding of the DCA likely requires
the outcome in some specific instances to resemble a veto in that the
deliberative process results in the Crown adopting an Aboriginal group’s
position whole cloth. In such a case, as Christie puts it, this “may appear
180. Nigel Bankes, “Little Salmon and the Juridical Nature of the Duty to Consult and Accommodate”
(10 December 2010), online (blog): ABlawg <https://ablawg.ca/2010/12/10/little-salmon-and-thejuridical-nature-of-the-duty-to-consult-and-accommodate/> [https://perma.cc/6UBY-5EPH].
181. Gitxaala, supra note 24 at para 279; TWN, supra note 141 at paras 502, 559, 563; Squamish
2019, supra note 178 at paras 63-64. But see Hanson, supra note 8 at 22-23.
182. Mary Liston, “Transubstantiation in Canadian Public Law: Processing Substance and
Instantiating Process” in John Bell, Mark Elliot, Jason NE Varuhas & Philip Murray, eds, Public
Law Adjudication in Common Law Systems: Process and Substance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016)
213. The requirement of accommodation, articulated by the Supreme Court as arising only in some
instances, is hard to square with the more deliberative aspects of the Court’s reasons. If consultation is
a dialogue conducted in good faith, as the Court states, then accommodation should be part-and-parcel
of that dialogue.
183. As opposed to the incoherence that arises from the assertion of Crown sovereignty over preexisting legal systems, which is nicely illustrated by Christie’s retelling (Christie, supra note 8 at
155-157).
184. Haida, supra note 7 at para 48. This language is repeated in numerous cases. See eg: Gitxaala,
supra note 24 at para 179; Chippewas, supra note 134 at para 59; Prophet River First Nation v British
Columbia (Environment), 2017 BCCA 58 at para 65.
185. Craik “Reconciliation,” supra note 32 at 674.
186. See, eg, Chambers, supra note 28 at 309 (willingness to revise preference is a key distinction
between deliberation and other forms of talk).
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to the observer that Aboriginal [N]ations are exercising veto powers, [but]
what is actually transpiring is the restraint of Crown power.”187 Attending
to these deliberative conditions means that the Crown must be prepared to
reject some major projects, at least in some instances, where the concerns
of Aboriginal groups are so serious as to persuade the Crown to change its
position. And the Crown must be open to such persuasion.188
This part has shown that this restraint of Crown power flows from
the deliberative conditions contained elsewhere in the DCA. As discussed
in Part I, these deliberative conditions are grounded in a theory that
explains how the exercise of public power can have legal and democratic
authority within the Canadian legal system.189 Making explicit the implicit
deliberative conditions contained in the DCA would allow courts to give
full effect to the DCA.
This part has clarified EA law using three public law frames: EA as
procedural fairness for the public, EA as public inquiry and EA as framework
for the DCA. In addition, it has argued that these three public law frames
contain three essential conditions for deliberative decision-making. While
implicit and not always fully realized, each of these areas of public law
nonetheless recognizes the responsible agency of those affected, seeks
to foster mutual respect, and requires reflexivity. Elucidating these three
shared deliberative conditions explains how the deliberative aspirations
of EA are immanent in the public law backdrop which informs its modern
legislative form.
3. Modern environmental assessment law reform
Reforms to BC and Canada’s EA legislation underscore the need to
clarify the public law context of EA law. Features such as a planning
phase, incorporation of community knowledge, and the recognition
of Indigenous jurisdiction all have the potential to move EA in Canada
toward the deliberative model long supported by EA research. However,
187. Christie, supra note 8 at 178.
188. As the BC Court of Appeal has observed, “consultation must begin with “the full range of
possible outcomes” (WMFN, supra note 174 at para 149.) See also Blaney et al v British Columbia
(The Minister of Agriculture Food and Fisheries) et al, 2005 BCSC 283 at para 127: “The Ministry
is to approach this consultation with an open mind and be prepared to withdraw its approval of the
amendment if, after reasonable consultation, it determines that it is necessary to do so…” Rejecting a
project is noted as within the range of options in CR, supra note 14 para 32.
189. To be clear, however, this is not sufficient to bring the DCA in light with international
commitments under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples nor is does it reflect
nation-to-nation relationships between Canadian jurisdictions and Indigenous nations. See eg Brenda
Gunn et al, UNDRIP Implementation: Braiding International, Domestic and Indigenous Laws,
Special Report (Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017), online: CIGI: <https://www.
cigionline.org/publications/undrip-implementation-braiding-international-domestic-and-indigenouslaws>.
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these legislative reforms are not straight-forward; they do not simply
codify pre-existing government obligations to engage with those affected
by EA decisions. There is a risk that the public law connections detailed
in Part II will remain obscured. To counter this risk, this part provides a
brief example of a new EA reform to show how EA as procedural fairness,
EA as public inquiry in miniature, and EA as DCA framework are merged
and extended through this reform. It then identifies the role that shared
deliberative conditions can and should play in providing a clear and
coherent baseline for the implementation and interpretation of EA reforms.
BC and Canada’s EA legislation now contain a “planning phase”190
or “early engagement stage,”191 which begins when the EA requirements
of the legislation are triggered by the proponent’s application. Planning or
early engagement effectively creates a participatory process for determining
the process. That is. it provides for input from local communities, other
jurisdictions (Indigenous and non-Indigenous), and the public broadly on
both the project design and the content of the EA before the assessment is
undertaken. It precedes the assessment and ends with a determination of
whether the proposed project should be exempted from an EA, rejected
outright, or subject to an EA. In BC, this is one of two points in the EA
regime in which the Agency is required to seek the consent of participating
Indigenous Nations.192
The inclusion of mandatory planning and early engagement is a move
toward best practices.193 Early input allows those affected to shape the
substantive concerns to be addressed in the assessment as well as how
they will be addressed (eg modes of continued engagement through the
EA process and monitoring). Planning and early engagement allow for
mutual learning between proponent, communities, and government before
positions on specific issues become entrenched. They create opportunities
for both the EA and the final decision to respond fully to concerns that are
brought forward early in the process.
In addition to EA best practice, planning and early engagement can
also be understood as an instantiation of the three public law frames
described above. First, like the common law duty of fairness, planning
and early engagement guarantees those affected a right to be heard with
“full and fair consideration”194 of their concerns. But it also extends on
190. IAA, supra note 19 ss 10-15.
191. EAA, supra note 19 ss 13-18.
192. Ibid, s 16(1). Note that the Minister does retain ultimate decision-making power to move ahead
even in the absence of consensus.
193. See Part I.B. supra text surrounding notes 32 to 35.
194. Baker, supra note 63 at para 32.
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the Baker requirement of “full and fair consideration” by ensuring that
concerns are heard well before the EA and its final decision gain too much
momentum for those concerns to be taken seriously.
Second, the planning and early engagement reforms emulate the
model of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, which included early
engagement while also being flexible in the form of that engagement.
Canada and BC’s reforms require this early stage of EA without mandating
the specific content of planning or engagement. While this creates a risk
of minimalist implementation, it also creates the opportunity for Agency
leadership to require creative and deliberative early engagement that is
responsive to local needs. As the Inquiry demonstrates, early engagement
allows decision-makers to craft an assessment process that is responsive
to the pressing concerns of local communities both in terms of substance
(eg title and land negotiations) and process (eg informal and inclusive
community hearings).
Finally, planning and early engagement are crucial parts of how the
DCA will be operationalized for major project decisions. Canada’s interim
guidelines outline a collaborative and consent-seeking approach with
Indigenous Nations for the planning phase. One outcome of this stage is
a collaboratively-designed Indigenous Engagement and Partnership Plan,
which outlines participation, collaboration, and partnership arrangements
between Canada and affected Indigenous Peoples.195 BC’s EAA also
empowers the Agency to conclude partnership agreements with affected
Indigenous Nations.196 But the provincial legislation also moves the
Agency beyond the constitutional minimum set out in the DCA with its
consent-seeking mandate and specific requirements to secure the consent
of participating Indigenous Nations.197 Planning and early engagement
thus seem to incorporate and potentially surpass the strongest aspects of
the existing DCA by requiring dialogue and meaningful engagement on
these strategic decisions about the nature of consultation itself. Moreover,
the outcome of the planning and early engagement stage is a set of reasons
that demonstrates how consensus was sought, and ideally achieved, for the
EA process going forward.
In sum, planning and early engagement features in the reformed EA
legislation extend and merge aspects of the duty of fairness, regulatory
practice, and the DCA. This means that each of these public law frames is,
on its own, inadequate for interpreting the legal scope of the new design
195. “Indigenous Participation,” supra note 149. See also “Indigenous collaboration,” supra note 149.
196. EAA, supra note 19 ss 41, 43-44.
197. Ibid, s 7.
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features. Yet the deliberative conditions shared across these three public
law frames have the potential to guide interpretation and implementation
in a way that helps modern EA law better achieve its deliberative potential.
The specific, nuanced requirements of these conditions must be
worked out in light of the particularities of each case. But the deliberative
conditions ought to prompt several questions about the administration
of the planning or early engagement stage. For example, did this stage
provide an inclusive opportunity for those who are affected to exercise
their agency? As the three public law frames demonstrate, recognizing
the responsible agency of those affected means treating engagement as a
central part of the public decision-making process, not a formality or one
of many inputs in a decision-making calculus.
Second, was this a planning process that was appropriately facilitative
of the agency of those affected? That is, did it create fair and equal
conditions for engagement by those affected? The three public law frames
demonstrate attention to the conditions for participation. Mutual respect
means participants and decision-makers alike must approach the process
in the spirit of understanding, free from bias and stereotypes.198 It means
attention to the different abilities of those affected to engage (eg timing
and funding needs) and the different ways in which concerns will be
communicated.
Finally, did planning and early engagement culminate in a decision
that was responsive to reasons presented during this stage? Again, the
three public law frames demonstrate that reflexivity and, in particular,
the provision of responsive and public-regarding reasons by the decisionmaker are a condition of the legitimate exercise of public authority.
Reflexive reasons have particular importance early in the EA since their
absence is likely to brew resentment and a lack of trust for those affected
by the final decision.
Conclusion
This article has argued that the deliberative aspirations for EA are sourced
in law. Contrary to dominant legal characterizations as essentially technical
198. Two recent examples provide some context: eg, the use of security or police action to chill
peaceful and legitimate public questioning of proposals (Frances Willick, “Province Won’t Investigate
Rough Arrest at Gold Mine Meeting,” CBC (30 May 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/
nova-scotia/john-perkins-arrest-atlantic-gold-investigation-complaint-1.5155883> [https://perma.cc/
XGX2-NWNS]), and racist blacklash directed at First Nations during provincial and federal planning
decisions on protecting caribou (Andrew Kurjata, West Moberly First Nations Chief Denounces ‘Fear
Mongering’ Over Caribou Protection Plan,” CBC (18 April 2019), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbia/caribou-draft-plan-west-moberly-chief-racism-jobs-1.5102961>
[https://
perma.cc/D2J2-4YKK]).

900 The Dalhousie Law Journal

or essentially political, this article has clarified that EA legislation can
be explained through three public law frames. Understanding EA as
procedural fairness for the public, public inquiry in miniature, and as a
framework for implementing the DCA clarifies its long-standing objective
of ensuring meaningful engagement with those affected by EA decisions.
Moreover, a close analysis of the duty of fairness, the influence of the
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, and the DCA has revealed they contain
three essential deliberative conditions. Each recognizes the responsible
agency of those affected by public decisions, fosters mutual respect, and
commits participants and decision-makers to reflexivity. These conditions
are part of a broader theory of public authority that is realized (in part)
through these three areas of public law.
The general contribution of this article is to show that there is a
mutually-informing potential of environmental law and public law theory
and doctrine. As a pillar of environmental law and the only consistent point
of transparent and participatory environmental decision-making across
Canada, EA law must be informed by general public law requirements.
Conversely, as a site of recent and innovative law reform, the novel design
features of EA legislation ought to illuminate the creative and deliberative
potential laden in the public law doctrine.
The article’s specific contributions have been to clarify the complex
characteristics of EA law through the use of three more familiar public law
frames and to show that these public law frameworks support deliberative
EA in law, not just as policy aspiration. This public law clarification of
EA further helps to supply an interpretive framework for novel design
features enacted by Canada and BC. This article argues that modern EA
provisions must be implemented and interpreted in a manner that attends
to the responsible agency of those affected, the conditions for mutual
respect, and the obligation of reflexivity. In this way, EA law can ensure
that consequential decisions about the future of human and ecological
communities fulfill the deliberative commitments immanent in Canadian
public law.

